Compulsory Insurance under EC Directive 2009/20/EC - An Adequate Solution for Victims, or is it also Time for the Abolition of Maritime Limitation of Liability and the Establishment of an International Fund as an Insurer of Last Resort? by Gauci, GM
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, Vol. 45, No. 1, January, 2014
Compulsory Insurance Under EC Directive
2009/20/EC – An Adequate Solution for
Victims, or is it also Time for the Abolition of
Maritime Limitation of Liability and the
Establishment of an International Fund as an




The protection of victims through compulsory liability insurance is not a
new phenomenon, and there are a substantial number of instances in indige-
nous as well as European sourced English legislation which provide for com-
pulsory insurance.1 Compulsory liability insurance has existed in relation to
employers’ liability and road traffic accidents in English law for a long time;
the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 generally impos-
es a requirement on employers doing business in Great Britain “to insure, and
maintain insurance, under one or more approved policies with an authorised
insurer or insurers against liability for bodily injury or disease sustained by
his employees, and arising out of and in the course of their employment in
Great Britain in that business.”2 Compulsory insurance has been a constant
feature of road traffic legislation since the enactment of the Road Traffic Act
1930.3 In some instances, victims of accidents are also protected by a
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1See Merkin, R., Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts, (2012) 75 (3) MLR 301 at 317.
2Loc. cit., section 1.
3See Churchill Insurance v. Wilkinson, [2010] Lloyd’s Insurance and Reinsurance Law Reports 591,
where at p. 593 Waller LJ stated: “Compulsory insurance has been a feature of legislation in the United
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Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No 3061).
replacement of negligence with strict liability.4 The tort system in English law
is fragmented with common law negligence being the primary avenue for a
remedy, some schemes for strict liability such as in relation to maritime pol-
lution, as well as some instances of a back-up fund, e.g. the IOPC Fund sys-
tems referred to below, and the Motor Insurers Bureau5 scheme in relation to
road accidents.6 In contrast, a bolder and more radical, though probably
imperfect, approach for compensation based on community responsibility in
lieu of liability was adopted in 1974 in New Zealand in respect of personal
injury by accident. That scheme has not been followed in other common law
systems, but has been said to have parallels in the social insurance schemes
adopted in Sweden and some other legal systems.7
In maritime transport, one comes across compulsory insurance in CLC
19698 and CLC 1992,9 in HNS 201010 (Chapter 2), in the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001, and in
the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks 2007.11 In
these cases, compulsory insurance is coupled with a right of direct action in
terms of which the victim has the right to proceed directly against the insur-
er.12 A recent development is EC Directive 2009/20/EC13 in terms of which
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International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage Fund Convention 1992 (Fund Convention 1992) and the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001.
5See section 145 of Road Traffic Act 1988 c. 52.
6The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury under the
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pensation scheme. (See, generally, Cane P., Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, (7th Edition,
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
7See Lunney and Oliphant, Tort Law, OUP 2010, at p. 983.
8International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969.
9International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992.
10International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 2010.
11An early Convention imposing a compulsory insurance scheme was the Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear Ships (Brussels 1962). It has been said that “compulsory insurance created inter-
est due to the large number of migrants carried by sea during the first quarter of the 20th century.” (See
Damar, D., Compulsory Insurance in International Maritime Conventions, (2009) JIML 151 at 155, and
authority there cited.)
12See, for instance: CLC 1992, Article VII, paragraph 8; The European Communities (Rights against
Insurers) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/3061) regulation 3(2).
13Directive 2009/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the insur-
ance of shipowners for maritime claims. Article 9 of the Directive requires member States to “bring into
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before
1 January 2012.” See also EC regulation 393/2009 on the Liability of Carriers of Passengers by Sea in
the Event of Accidents, in relation to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974, as
amended by the 2002 Protocol.
insurance is imposed in relation to all claims subject to limitation under the
1996 Convention on Limitation of Liability. It should be noted, however, that,
in terms of Article 3(e) of the Limitation Convention and section 185(4) of
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995,14 a claim by the crew for personal injury is
not necessarily encumbered by limitation in terms of an opt-out from the
English Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Furthermore, claims in respect of “the
raising, removal, destruction or the rendering harmless of a ship which is
sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, including anything that is or has been
on board such ship” are subject to limitation of liability under article 2 of the
London Limitation Convention of 1976. However, the Merchant Shipping
Act 1995, which implements the Limitation Convention 1976/1996 into
English Law, deals specifically with limitation in respect of wreck removal
by providing in paragraph 3 that “(1) Paragraph 1(d) of article 2 shall not
apply unless provision has been made by an order of the Secretary of State
for the setting up and management of a fund to be used for the making to har-
bour or conservancy authorities of payments needed to compensate them for
the reduction, in consequence of the said paragraph 1(d), of amounts recov-
erable by them in claims of the kind there mentioned, and to be maintained
by contributions from such authorities raised and collected by them in respect
of vessels in like manner as other sums so raised by them.”15
Limitation of liability for wreck removal is a practically contentious issue
in particular because a place of refuge is in practice less likely to be made
available by a coastal state where liability for the costs of removing the
wreck is subject to limitation,16 despite the obligation on a coastal state under
customary international law to provide a place of refuge to a vessel in dis-
tress.17 The victim is one obvious beneficiary of compulsory insurance, par-
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14Section 185(4) provides: “The provisions having the force of law under this section shall not apply
to any liability in respect of loss of life or personal injury caused to, or loss of or damage to any proper-
ty of, a person who is on board the ship in question or employed in connection with that ship or with the
salvage operations in question if—
(a) he is so on board or employed under a contract of service governed by the law of any part
of the United Kingdom; and
(b) the liability arises from an occurrence which took place after the commencement of this
Act.
In this subsection, “ship” and “salvage operations” have the same meaning as in the Convention.”
15Merchant shipping Act 1995, Part II, Schedule 7.
16See McMahon L., Limiting Liability for Wreck Removal is not the Answer, Lloyds List, 20/09/2013.
17As to the extent of the right to a place of refuge, see: Tanaka,Y, International Law of the Sea, 2012,
Cambridge at pp. 81 et seq; Rothwell D.R., Stephens T., The International Law of the Sea, Hart
Publishing, 2010, p. 55; Chircop A., The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress, pp. 163-230
(Chapter 8) in ChircopA., and Linden O., Places of Refuge for Ships: Emerging Environmental Concerns
of a Maritime Custom, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2006; Chircop A., Law of the Sea and
International Environmental Law Considerations for Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance,
pp. 231-270 (chapter 9), in Chircop A., and Linden O., Places of Refuge for Ships: Emerging
Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2006.
ticularly if coupled with a right of direct action. However, this is not its only
purpose, as there is also undoubtedly an obvious benefit to the insured.
There is also the important benefit that when a decision is being made by a
coastal state as to whether to provide a place of refuge to a vessel in distress,
whether in internal waters or in the territorial sea zone, the existence of
insurance makes the decision easier for the relevant maritime authority.18
This benefit will obviously be less effective if Protection and Indemnity
Clubs achieve their demand19 for the capping of such insurance. Insurance
or some other type of financial security also ensures that a judgment in rela-
tion to liability (in the maritime sphere likely to be protected by limitation
of such liability) is likely to be executable and enforceable because an insur-
ance company has a deep pocket.
The desirability of having financial security to provide repatriation for
abandoned seafarers was highlighted in the ninety-first session of the Legal
Committee of the International Maritime Organisation.20 The Maritime
Labour Convention of 2006 (now in force) stipulates that each Member shall
require ships that fly its flag to provide financial security to ensure that sea-
farers are duly repatriated in accordance with the Code.21 This is backed up,
if necessary, by Standard A2.5 – Repatriation, which attempts to ensure that
a seafarer will not suffer the costs of repatriation.
Perhaps of as much importance as the existence of compulsory insurance
is the fact that in most instances the victim of a maritime incident will find
that a claim is likely to be partially subject to limitation of liability, general-
ly under national legislation implementing at least one international conven-
tion. It may also be possible that more than one limitation regime is appli-
cable to a particular loss, as would be the case where a claim under the
Hague-Visby Rules is further limited under the 1996 Limitation Convention
regime, or where a defendant in an action in recourse for oil pollution dam-
age limits liability as a charterer under the 1996 Limitation regime in respect
of a successful claim against a shipowner under the oil pollution liability
regime.22 It is interesting to note that a compulsory insurance regime estab-
lished by the Directive is inextricably linked with limitation of liability as
discussed below.
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18See, Donner, P., Insurance Perspective on Places of Refuge, in Chircop, A., and Linden, O., Places
of Refuge for Ships – Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom, Martinus Nijhoff,
Leiden/Boston, 2006, pp. 321-346 (Chapter12), particularly at p. 346.
19See Mulrenan, J., Costa Concordia Removal Sparks Demand for $1bn Limit on Payouts,
TradeWinds, 20 September 2013, p. 21.
20See IMO documentation LEG 91/12, at 18-20, 9 May 2006.
21Loc. Cit., Regulation 2.5.
22See: The CMA Djakarta, (2004) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 460.
II
THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN THE ENGLISH TORT OF
NEGLIGENCE
Legal strictures have at times not prevented an adjudicator from granting
a remedy where one is not strictly available, and compulsory insurance in
this respect is very relevant. In the case of Nettleship v. Weston,23 an English
court of appeal applied the same standard of care in terms of the law of neg-
ligence in relation to a learner driver as to a fully competent and qualified
driver, in order to achieve the pragmatic result of granting a remedy to the
victim of that learner driver. Lord Denning M.R. was quite clear in justify-
ing that decision:
Thus we are, in this branch of the law, moving away from the concept: ‘No
liability without fault.’ We are beginning to apply the test: ‘on whom should
the risk fall?’Morally the learner driver is not at fault; but legally she is liable
to be because she is insured and the risk should fall on her.24
Insurance is therefore used as a justification for granting a remedy where
in terms of bare law one should not be granted, but policy dictates that a just
solution should be made available. However, there are some objections to
this rule, to the effect that liability should not be dependent on considera-
tions relating to the availability or otherwise of first or third party insurance,
whether voluntary or compulsory.25 Indeed, as a matter of strict legal princi-
ple, the existence or otherwise of first or third party insurance in relation to
a specific incident subject to litigation should not be considered at all rele-
vant in the determination of tortious or delictual liability. Recent legal dicta26
however follow the practical approach adopted by Lord Denning in the
above statement, and the availability or otherwise of insurance in relation to
a specific incident seems now to be a relevant policy consideration.
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23(1971) 2 Q.B. 691 (CA).
24Id., at 700.
25See, in particular, Stapleton J, Tort Insurance and Ideology, (1995) 58 MLR 820.
26See, in particular, Vowles v. Evans [2003] 1 WLR 1607 at 1614, per Lord Phillips MR in the con-
text of litigation relating to a sports injury: “We accept that the availability of insurance, both to players
against the risk of injury and to referees against the risk of third party liability could bear on the policy
question of whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on referees. These were mat-
ters explored in Van Oppen v. Clerk to the Bedford Charity Trustees [1990] 1 WLR 235.”
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III
PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY CLUBS AND MARITIME
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Maritime liability insurance is usually provided by Protection and
Indemnity Clubs (P&I),27 although their role in this respect is not exclusive;
for example, a three-quarter collision liability insurance is provided under
the ordinary hull clauses available on the London hull insurance market.
Furthermore, European P & I Clubs28 have been largely prohibited from pro-
viding insurance in relation to vessels carrying Iranian oil on the basis of
European Council Regulation 267/2012,29 thus necessitating the provision of
alternative financial security.30
In this context, one must mention that P&I Clubs specify in their contrac-
tual rules with the insured that “the owner is only insured in respect of such
sums as he has paid to discharge the liabilities or to pay the losses, costs or
expenses . . .” or words to similar effect. Such wording is known as the “pay
first rule” or the “pay to be paid rule.”31 Such a rule will obviously provide
a serious legal hurdle to any third party (to the insurance contract) who may
wish to recover from the Club. However, it must be stated that, as a matter
of Club practice, this rule is not always strictly applied and Clubs are often
27For a history of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, see The History and Development of Protecting
and Indemnity Clubs, Report of Advanced Study Group No. 109 of the Insurance Institute of London,
8th January 1957.
28See IOPC Fund Assembly Documentation: IOPC/APR12/12/1 27 April 2012.
29See: in particular Article 11 paragraph (d) of the said European Council Regulation; Good Luck
Shipping LLC v. Council of the European Union (case T57/12 (ECJ General Court 6 September 2013);
Osler D., P & I clubs still barred from providing IRISL cover, Lloyd’s List, 23 September 2013.
30http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uki/Latest_Publications/Report___Accounts/2012/San
ctions%20circular%20June%202012.pdf (accessed on 17th September 2013).
31See UK P & I Rules of 2013, Rule 2(i) which provide: “Unless otherwise agreed between an Owner
and the Managers, the risks covered by the Association are as set out in Sections 1 to 26 below,
PROVIDED ALWAYS that: (i) Unless and to the extent that the Directors otherwise decide,
an Owner is only insured in respect of such sums as he has paid to discharge the liabilities or
to pay the losses, costs or expenses referred to in those sections…;”
Rule 5 of the same rules provides that: “(A) Payment first by the Owner. Unless the Directors
in their discretion otherwise decide, it is a condition precedent of an Owner’s right to recov-
er from the funds of theAssociation in respect of any liabilities, costs or expenses that he shall
first have discharged or paid the same out of funds belonging to him unconditionally and not
by way of loan or otherwise. . . .
Save as provided in Rule 1(9), the cover provided by the Association as set out in these Rules
is solely for the benefit of the Owner, and any Joint Owner, Group Affiliate, other association
or insurer, or permitted assign, to the extent allowed by Rules 10, 11, 13 and 15. It is not
intended, save as provided in Rule 1(9), that rights should be acquired by any third party,
through the operation of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 of the United
Kingdom or similar legislation.”
flexible in providing funds to victims of, for instance, ship-source oil pollu-
tion damage.
IV
DIFFICULTIES WITH LIABILITY INSURANCE
As indicated earlier, liability insurance, particularly if compulsory, may
well have given rise to a change in judicial attitudes to recovery. However, it
is often associated with problems relating to the right of direct action as well
as to the availability of a number of defences available to the insurer.
Furthermore, although compulsory insurance enhances the chances of
recovery for the victim, it is likely to be subject to a contractual capping as
well as the limit of liability available in shipping law generally.
A. P & I Clubs and Direct Action
In the case of a direct action against the insurer, the insurer may invoke
some defences which the shipowner could have used. For instance, the Oil
Pollution Conventions would allow the insurer to utilise a defence that the
loss was caused by an act of war, or a natural phenomenon of an exception-
al, inevitable and irresistible character.32 The defence of bankruptcy or wind-
ing up of the shipowner is not permitted.33 Furthermore, the insurer may
limit its liability to an amount equal to the required financial security, even
though the shipowner may himself have lost the right to limit liability. The
insurer will be exonerated from liability if the loss was caused by the wilful
misconduct of the shipowner.
A victim would most likely desire to use a right of direct action against an
underwriter where the assured is in, or on the verge of, a state of bankrupt-
cy, and hence the said assured would not be in a position to satisfy claims
made against him. In English law this eventuality is provided for by the
Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930, which in terms of section
1(1), transfers to a victim the rights of the insured against the insurer in the
eventuality of bankruptcy of the insured. Contractual avoidance of such
transfer is deemed ineffective.34 The 1930 statute is due to be replaced, at
some point in the future, by the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act
2010,35 which in section 9(5) similarly provides that “the transferred rights
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32See CLC 1992 Article III, and CLC 1992, Article VII, paragraph 8.
33CLC 1992, Article VII, paragraph 8; HNS 2010, Article 12(8).
34Loc. cit., section 1(5).
352010 c. 10.
are not subject to a condition requiring the prior discharge by the insured of
the insured’s liability to a third party.” However, section 9(6) of the 2010
statute states that “in the case of a contract of marine insurance, subsection
(5) applies only to the extent that the liability of the insured is a liability in
respect of death or personal injury.”36
B. The Fanti and the Padre Island
A Government’s explanatory note in relation to section 9 of the Third
Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 states that in terms of paragraphs
5 and 6 of section 9, the Fanti and Padre Island37 case remains preserved in
relation to marine insurance, except in the case of death or personal injury.38
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in the Fanti
and the Padre Island,39 itself a very controversial decision, illustrates the dif-
ficulty of reconciling the “pay first” rule with a right of direct action against
an insurer. In that case, it was held, in a situation of non-compulsory cargo
insurance, that a defendant P & I Club can validly, despite a statutory right
of direct action, defend itself against a direct action of a third party by claim-
ing that the insured member has itself not paid the third party. The tragedy
for the victim in such case is that the member, bankrupt or on the verge of
bankruptcy, is in an impossible situation to pay. The crucial reasoning of the
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in this case was that, prior to
winding up, the third party had only a contingent right against the Club.
Indeed this is the whole purpose of the “pay first” rule. In the decision by
the House of Lords,40 reference is made to the earlier judgment of Lord
Justice Bingham in the same litigation:41
He [Mr Justice Bingham] also stressed that under the Act there were to be
transferred to the third party only such rights as the insured had under the con-
tract of insurance, subject always to section 1(3) of the Act which in effect
prevented contracting out of the statutory transfer. This being the statutory
scheme, it is very difficult to see how it could be said that a condition of prior
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36It has been stated in this respect by Hazelwood, S., in P & I Clubs Law and Practice, 4th Edition,
§17.44 that: “This change is less revolutionary than it may seem at first glance given that in preparation
for the coming into force of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, some Clubs have changed their rules
to waive (i) any ‘pay-to-be-paid’ provision, and (ii) retrospective termination of cover in respect of claims
for crew injury or death.”
37(1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191.
38loc. cit.,p. 29, see Westlaw (accessed 28 December 2013); see also section 165(5) of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995.
39[1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191.
40[1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191, at 204.
41[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 239 at pp. 247-248.
payment would drive a coach and horses through the Act; for the Act was not
directed to giving the third party greater rights than the insured had under the
contract of insurance. But it is also necessary to observe that, in contrast to,
for example, employers and motorists, Parliament has not generally required
(apart from special cases, such as the Merchant Shipping Act, 1971) that ship
owners should be compulsorily insured against liability to third parties.Where
Parliament does require compulsory insurance, it generally provides in the rel-
evant legislation that clauses in the contract of insurance which defeat the pur-
pose of such insurance will be ineffective (see e.g. sections 148-150 of the
Road Traffic Act 1988, and paragraph 1 of the Employers’ Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) General Regulations, 1971, made pursuant to the
Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act, 1969).42
The reference to the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 in the
case above requires examination. The Act, and now the Merchant Shipping
Act 1995, make specific provision in relation to third party rights against
insurers. Section 165 of the 1995 Act provides for a right of direct action
against the person providing the insurance or other security. Where section
165 is applicable, the privity gap is bridged by statute in every case and not
merely in the case of bankruptcy. Unlike the Third Parties (Rights against
Insurers) Act, CLC 1969 and CLC 1992 do not contain any provision simi-
lar to section 1(3) of the Act which purports to render null certain clauses.
However, Article VII, paragraph 8, provides for a direct right of action by a
pollution victim against the shipowner’s underwriter, and in wording repli-
cated in later pollution conventions, provides that “the defendant shall not
avail himself of any other defence which he might have been entitled to
invoke in proceedings brought by the owner against him.” (emphasis added).
This phrase would effectively render inoperative the “pay first” rule includ-
ed in P & I Club rulebooks, even though the “pay first” rule has been held
in an arbitration award to be applicable in litigation relating to the oil spill
from the Prestige.43
However, section 165 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 does not
include this provision, thereby, prima facie, permitting the use of the “pay
first” rule by the insurer even in an action brought by the victim. This is
probably an oversight by the legislator in the drafting of the transposition of
CLC 1992 into English domestic law,44 and it could well mean that certifi-
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42Emphasis added.
43See: London Steam Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association v. Spain (The Prestige) [2013
EWHC 3188. Comm]. This matter is subject to an appeal, see Mulrenan, J., Spain Wins Time to Fight
Prestige Arbitration Award, TradeWinds, 4 October 2013, p. 5.
44In the case of implementation of CLC 1992 into English law, the draftsman reformulated the text of
the convention without appending the actual text as a schedule. This is one of the two approaches utilised
in the English legal system. The other method which simply gives effect to the Convention with the text
of the convention adopted in a statute is preferable, as it is less likely to create problems of interpretation
cates of insurance acceptable to the Secretary of State do not satisfy the strict
requirements of CLC 1992 as provided in Article VII paragraph 5 of CLC
1992. This unequivocally provides that:
An insurance or other financial security shall not satisfy the requirements of
this article if it can cease, for reasons other than the expiry of validity of the
insurance or security specified in the certificate under paragraph 2 of this arti-
cle, before three months have elapsed from the date on which notice of termi-
nation is given to the authorities . . .45
Within the context of the English Merchant Shipping Act 1995, it may
well be the case that the United Kingdom’s international law obligations as
a party to CLC 1992 are not being adhered to. This can obviously be cir-
cumvented, if the case were to be put to an English court, through the appli-
cation of a purposive interpretation of section 165 of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1995 which would block utilisation of the “pay first” rule. Such a solu-
tion would not have been needed if CLC 1992 had been transposed into
English without any alteration in its wording. Undoubtedly, the implemen-
tation of an international convention by reference without any change, or
with only minor cosmetic changes, has its attractions, whether or not the
international style of drafting is at variance with the domestic or national
counterpart.
Furthermore, on the basis of the statement of Lord Bingham referred to
above, it is strongly arguable that the Fanti and Padre Island decision should
no longer be interpreted as applicable to instances of compulsory insurance,
even when the statute does not provide for a right of direct action. At the
very least a broad compulsory insurance scheme necessitates a different
judicial policy approach.
C. Other Insurance Defences – CLC 1992
Article VII (8) of CLC 1992 provides that:
Any claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly
against the insurer or other person providing financial security for the owner’s
liability for pollution damage. In such case the defendant may, even if the
owner is not entitled to limit his liability according to Article V, paragraph 2,
avail himself of the limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1. He
may further avail himself of the defences (other than the bankruptcy or wind-
86 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce Vol. 45, No. 1
which would not otherwise arise. See, further, Mukherjee, P.K.,Maritime Legislation, WMU Publications,
Malmo 2002, Chapter 9.
45HNS 2010, Article 12(5); International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage 2001, Article 7(6).
ing up of the owner) which the owner himself would have been entitled to
invoke. Furthermore, the defendant may avail himself of the defence that the
pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct of the owner himself,
but the defendant shall not avail himself of any other defence which he might
have been entitled to invoke in proceedings brought by the owner against him.
The defendant shall in any event have the right to require the owner to be
joined in the proceedings. (emphasis added).46
The term “wilful misconduct” is an elusive term47 and can cause substan-
tial difficulty of interpretation and application.48 “Wilful misconduct”
occurs also in other conventions, for instance the CMR49 relating to the car-
riage of goods by road, where “wilful misconduct” on the part of the carri-
er can lead to the loss of the right to limit liability. Indeed, someone may be
grossly negligent without that action constituting wilful misconduct.50 The
term “wilful misconduct” also occurs in section 55 of the Marine Insurance
Act 1906.51
Furthermore, difficulties may arise as to the identity of owner. As to the
identity of the owner, similar problems have arisen in relation to section
39(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 where the alter ego test has been
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46Similar wording exists in HNS 2010, Article 12(8), and the Nairobi International Convention on the
Removal of Wrecks 2007, Article 12(10).
47In Laceys Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd v. Bowler International Freight Ltd, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 369,
Beldam, LJ stated that “Few phrases have been more fully considered in decisions of the Courts than wil-
ful misconduct.”
48See, further, generally, Damar D., Wilful Misconduct in International Transport Law, Hamburg
Studies on Maritime Affairs, Springer, 2011.
49Convention Relative au Contrat de Transportation International de Merchandises par Route,
Geneva, 1956, Article 29.
50See Denfleet International Ltd v. TNT Global SpA, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 504 CA at §18, where a
degree of awareness is held to be more relevant than the seriousness of the action itself; LordWaller deal-
ing with wilful misconduct in the context of the CMR distinguishes between the state of mind of a driv-
er who is a professional and one who is not: “In my view, although it is fair to say that people who fall
asleep at the wheel will have had warning signs before they fall asleep and, although it is grossly negli-
gent to ignore those warning signs, that negligence is in failing to appreciate that a driver cannot, what-
ever he may believe, defeat the sleepiness. The state of mind of the driver who is sleepy and continues to
drive is likely to be that he believes he will beat the sleep and be safe. A professional lorry driver is in a
different position from an ordinary driver particularly because limits are set by regulations. He knows
that the limits are set to avoid the risk of falling asleep, and if he deliberately ignores those limits he is
guilty of wilful misconduct (see Sidney G Jones Ltd v Martin Bencher Ltd, [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54). If
something has demonstrated to the driver that the driver cannot beat the sleepiness, such as hitting the
side of the road, again because he becomes aware that he cannot beat sleepiness, he would become guilty
of misconduct, indeed wilful misconduct.”
See also Clarke, M., The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by
Road 1956: Wilful Misconduct Again – and Again, 2008 JBL 184.
51See further The Isothel, (Supreme Court of Queensland (Full Court) December 1984) (Lloyd’s
Maritime Law Newsletter, 28 March 1985), where reckless disregard of the probable causes of one’s con-
duct, without the requirement of an intention to cause the loss of the vessel, was held to give rise to the
wilful misconduct of the assured for the purposes of the Australian Marine Insurance Act 1909.
applied.52 Application of the alter ego test outside the ambit of an actual
owning company, for instance within a management company acting as
agent for the owner, is also possible53 as the Pollution Conventions avoid the
use of the term “personal” as used in the 1976 Limitation Convention.
The exclusion of loss caused by wilful misconduct is effectively an appli-
cation of the ex turpi causa doctrine, to the effect that one cannot generally
rely on one’s illegality in the pursuit of a legal claim, and is also enshrined
in section 55 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. However, this doctrine has
its limitations, because insurance law does allow a claimant to make a claim
in respect of his negligence as long as this is not tantamount to wilful mis-
conduct. Furthermore, P & I Clubs routinely provide coverage in respect of
the payment of some types of fines imposed on the entered shipowner.
Although wilful misconduct of an employee during the course of employ-
ment may well give rise to the vicarious responsibility of the owner, the
owner may still be able to recover from his insurer if he himself, or his alter
ego in the case of a company or corporation, is not himself/itself contributo-
ry to the loss. This view is supported by the wording of section 41 of the
Marine Insurance Act 1906 which provides details about the implied war-
ranty of legality. However, an interpretational difficulty still persists in rela-
tion to the exact meaning and parameters of the term “wilful misconduct,”
which conveniently also can be found in a number of international transport
law conventions as part of the trigger for the mechanism which can disenti-
tle a carrier from the right of limitation of liability.
The effect of exonerating an insurer from liability in the case of wilful
misconduct may have the possibly unintended effect of removing a remedy
from a victim, at the same time that the wilful misconduct or similar conduct
is blocking the right for limitation of liability for the shipowner. The poten-
tial unfairness of allowing an insurer to avoid liability to a third party victim
in the case of deliberately caused damage, evident in the outcome in the road
traffic insurance case decided by the Court of Appeal Bristol Alliance Ltd
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52See: The Eurysthenes [1977] QB 49; The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1.
53The search of the alter ego of a company may necessitate a search beyond the confines of that com-
pany itself. In the context of the wording of the now inapplicable section 503 of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1894 (relating to limitation of liability), the search for the alter ego of a shipowning company went
as far as a partner in a ship management company; in The Charlotte, it was held that the case of Lennard’s
v. Asiatic Petroleum was authority for the proposition that when a ship is managed by a firm of two part-
ners, there would be fault or privity of the owner if there is fault or privity of any of the two partners. It
is strongly arguable that the same interpretation should be applicable to section 55 of the Marine
Insurance 1906, to the effect that the application of the law cannot be avoided by the delegation of tasks
by the assured, thereby effectively delegating its privity and consequent effects.
Partnership v. Williams,54 is offset by the fact that in such a road traffic case
a remedy is subsequently available from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau.
D. P & I Clubs’ Reluctance to Act as Guarantors under the United States
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 1990)
When the Oil PollutionAct of 199055 came into force in 1990, P & I Clubs
registered their reluctance to participate as guarantors of ship owners. That
Act provides that:
. . . any claim for which liability may be established under section 1002 may
be asserted directly against any guarantor providing evidence of financial
responsibility for a party responsible liable under that section for removal
costs and damages to which the claim pertains. In defending against such a
claim, the guarantor may invoke (1) all rights and defences which would be
available to the responsible party under this Act, (2) any defence authorised
under subsection (e), and (3) the defence that the incident was caused by the
wilful misconduct of the responsible party. The guarantor may not invoke any
other defence that might be available in proceedings brought by the responsi-
ble party against the guarantor.56
Besides nullifying the effect of the “pay first” rule, the above provision
could also see the guarantor losing the right to limit liability. Such a prospect
caused substantial concerns to P & I Clubs, which insisted that their role was
one of insurers and not guarantors,57 and that as guarantors, they could be
faced with unlimited liability.58 P & I Clubs expressed concern about the
possibility of “unlimited horizontal liability.”59 It was also said that it is pos-
sible that individual state statutes in the United States could repeatedly
expose a P & I Club to liability for the same incident.60 COFR61 guarantors,
which currently provide financial security for the purposes of OPA 1990, are
likewise exposed to the possibility of direct action.
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542013 2 W.L.R. 1029 CA (Civ Div); Hemsworth, Margaret, Insurance Obligations, the Road Traffic
Act 1988, 2013, Journal of Business Law, 354.
55Public Law 101-380 (H.R. 1465. August 18 1990).
56OPA 1990, §1016(f); USC Title 33 §2716(f).
57See Alcantara, L.F., and Cox, M.A., OPA Certificates of Financial Responsibility, 23 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 368 at 378.
58See, in particular, the statement of R.L. Youell before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and navigation, Nov. 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.
59Alcantara, L.F., and Cox, M.A., op.cit. at fn. 57, p. 380.
60See statement of R.L. Youell before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and navigation, 6th November 1991, p. 6.
61Certificate of Financial Responsibility for the purposes of OPA 1990.
V
DIRECTIVE 2009/20/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL OF 23 APRIL 2009 ON THE INSURANCE OF
SHIP OWNERS FOR MARITIME CLAIMS
This Directive, implemented into English Law by the Merchant Shipping
(Compulsory Insurance of Shipowners for Maritime Claims) Regulations
2012/2267,62 constitutes a very important milestone in the history of mar-
itime law. As indicated earlier, there has existed a system of compulsory
insurance in international law for a number of years for some pollution
claims,63 wreck removal expenses,64 and also more recently in terms of the
Maritime Labour Convention 2006. For the purposes of domestic English
law, power is granted to the Secretary of State in the Merchant Shipping and
Maritime Security Act 199765 to make regulations requiring insurance as
specified in such regulations.66
A purpose of the Directive is stated in paragraph 4 of the Preamble there-
of, which states, in part:
The obligation to have insurance should make it possible to ensure better pro-
tection for victims. It should also help to eliminate substandard ships and
make it possible to re-establish competition between operators.67
This paragraph refers also to resolution A.898 (21) adopted by the IMO
Assembly on 25 November 1999 entitled “Guidelines on Ship Owners’
Responsibilities in Respect of Maritime Claims.”68 In the Resolution, the
Assembly invited Member governments “to urge ship owners to comply
with the Guidelines.”69 Paragraph 4.1 of the Guidelines provides that “ship
owners should ensure that liability for relevant claims up to the limits set
under Articles 6 and 7 of the Limitation Convention is covered by insur-
ance.” The Limitation Convention is defined in paragraph 1 of the
Guidelines as the 1976 Limitation Convention including amendments in
force internationally, and the relevant claims are those referred to in Article
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62Partially in force as from October 5 2012. The regulations make special provisions in relation to lia-
bility for delay.
63CLC 1992, The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996 and the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001.
64The Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks 2007.
651997 c. 28.
66Section 192A; see The Merchant Shipping (Compulsory Insurance: Ships Receiving Trans-shipped
Fish) Regulations 1998 (S.I. 1998 No. 209).
67Preamble, paragraph (4).
68IMO Documentation A21/Res.898 (4 February 2000).
69Loc.cit., Preamble.
2(1) of the Limitation Convention, with the exception of cargo claims.
Whilst the Guidelines constitute an exhortation in respect of owners of ships
of 300 gross tonnage and above, other ship owners are also encouraged to
the same effect.70 These Guidelines probably expose a substantial part of
what is wrong with the International Maritime Organisation, namely the
occasional lack of will to provide binding international legislation in respect
of matters which can be left for another day.
Whereas, at the level of the international maritime law the imposition of
compulsory insurance across the board has been talked about but never taken
very seriously,71 this European Directive, which required transposition into
national law before 1 January 2012, imposes a requirement of insurance to
cover maritime claims subject to limitation under the 1996 Limitation of
Liability Convention,72 and the requirement of “the amount of insurance for
each and every ship per incident shall be equal to the relevant maximum
amount for the limitation of liability as laid down in the 1996 Convention.”73
The Directive excludes application to ships below three hundred gross ton-
nage,74 as well as to warships, auxiliary warships or other State owned or
operated ships used for a non-commercial public service.75
The claims referred to in the Directive are listed in Article 2 of the
Limitation Convention, and whilst not covering every imaginable claim,
include “claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss of or
damage to property (including damage to harbour works, basins and
waterways and aids to navigation), occurring on board or in direct con-
nection with the operation of the ship or with salvage operations, and con-
sequential loss resulting therefrom.” The compulsory insurance Directive
is enforced through a system of flag state control,76 and port-state con-
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70Loc. cit., paragraph 2.1.
71Resolution A.898 (21) of the International Maritime Organisation implored States to urge ship own-
ers to be properly insured.
72This is a reference to the “Consolidated Text of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims,” as adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), as amended by the
1996 Protocol, (Directive 2009/20/EC, Article 3(c)).
73Loc. cit., Article 4(3).
74Some legal systems impose insurance on vessels with a tonnage lower than that in the directive. For
instance, regulation 5(1) of the Small Ships Regulations (Subsidiary Legislation 499.52, Malta) pro-
vides: “No mechanically driven small ship shall be eligible to be registered unless it is in compliance
with regulation 4 and there is in force in relation to such mechanically driven small ship a policy of insur-
ance for an amount to be approved by the Authority which indemnifies such person, persons or classes
of persons as may be authorised and covered by the policy against any liability which may be incurred
by him or them in respect of death, injury or damage to third party property caused by, or arising out of,
the use of the mechanically driven small ship.”
75Loc. cit., Article 2 (1) and (2).
76Loc. cit., Article 4(1).
trol.77 It will however be difficult for a coastal state to impose a require-
ment of insurance on vessels exercising the right of innocent passage in
terms of customary international law or the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea 1982.78 The Directive is silent as to the legal posi-
tion as to whether the obligation of a coastal state to provide refuge to a
vessel in distress is overridden by the legal requirement of compulsory
insurance in term S of the Directive.
Although the Directive provides for compulsory insurance in respect of a
number of substantial claims, it fails to provide a right of direct action
against the insurer for the victim of an incident. This is obviously a detri-
mental factor in relation to the allocation of risks and may prevent a victim
from obtaining satisfactory compensation. It is notable that Article 3 (c) of
the Directive provides an exemplar of the relevant insurance by referring to
the “indemnity insurance of the type currently provided by the International
Group of P & I Clubs.”
The Directive requires each member State to require that shipowners of
ships flying its flag have insurance covering such ships, but the mechanism of
claiming by the insured against the insured shipowner and the existence of the
“pay first” rule may create a difficult recovery for the victim. Different legal
systems apply different prescriptive periods or time-bars, and damage, for
instance in respect of personal injury, may occur at a later point in time after
an incident occurs. To this effect, one notices the wording in the CLC 1992
and the HNS Convention in relation to the operation of the time bar.79 Unless
the time-bar in respect of the claim of the shipowner against the liability insur-
er is adequately matched by the contractual time-bar in the insurance policy,
the cover may be of no avail to a victim pursuing a long-tailed claim, such as
an asbestos-induced personal injury. For instance, Rule 5 (O) of the UK
Protection and Indemnity Club Rulebook renders recovery dependent on time-
ly notification by the insured shipowner80 and may be used by the liability
insurer to strengthen a defence based on the “pay first rule.”
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77Loc. cit., Article 5. Article 5 of the Directive provides an enforcement mechanism based on port-
state inspections, and in case of non-compliance, and without prejudice to the detention mechanisms on
the basis of Directive 2009/16/EC [2009 Directive on Port state Control], “the competent authority may
issue an expulsion order to the ship which shall be notified to the Commission, the other Member States
and the flag state concerned.” Member States will refuse entry until compliance (ibid.).
78UNCLOS 1982. It is notable that Article 4(3) of the Directive cautiously provides that Member States
can enforce territorial water compliance if this is in conformity with international law (loc. cit., Art. 4(2)).
79See: CLC 1992 Article 8; HNS Convention Article 37.
80The wording of Rule 5 (O) of the UK P & I Club Rules of 2013 provides as follows:
“Time bar: In the event that:
(i) an Owner fails to notify the Managers of any casualty, event or claim referred to in para-
graph (N) (i) of this Rule within one year after he has knowledge thereof; or (ii) an Owner
VI
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY - IS ABOLITION ANYWHERE ON
THE HORIZON?
Limitation of liability in maritime law has been around for a very long
time, and there is hardly any prospect of its abolition, at least under the aus-
pices of the International Maritime Organisation. Maritime Law seems sad-
dled with a small number of ancient relics besides limitation of liability: e.g.
the law of general average,81 and the application of the law of bailment in
carriage of goods by sea.82 Nevertheless, there have been sporadic instances
of judicial dicta raising a degree of concern about the continuing viability of
maritime limitation of liability,83 including a strong statement made by Judge
Kozinski in the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.84
However, one can envisage that maritime limitation of liability may well
be open to challenge as a violation of Article 1 of the first protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his pos-
sessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of proper-
ty in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties.
A strong argument can be made to the effect that the main purported jus-
tification for maritime limitation of liability is the perceived necessity of
encouragement of maritime business by states,85 whether this is through the
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fails to submit a claim to the Managers for reimbursement of any liabilities, costs or expens-
es within one year after discharging or settling the same; the Owner’s claim against the
Association shall be discharged and the Association shall be under no further liability in
respect thereof unless the Directors in their discretion shall otherwise determine.”
81See generally, Selmer, K.S., The Survival of General Average, Pitman, London, 1958.
82See McMeel, G., The Redundancy of Bailment, 2003, LMCLQ 169.
83See, for instance: The Bramley Moore [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 429 at 437; The Garden City No. 2
[1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 37 at 44.
84Esta Lataer Charterers v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1989) where Judge Kozinski made the
following statement in relation to the 1851 Limitation Act: “Misshapen from the start, the subject of later
incrustations, arthritic with age, the Limitation Act has ‘provided the setting for judicial lawmaking sel-
dom equalled’… Congress might be well advised to examine other approaches or to consider whether
the rationale underlying the Liability Act continues to have vitality as we enter the last decade of the
twentieth century.”
85See generally:Adler,A. G., For Abolition or Liberalization of Present Limitation of Liability Statutes,
1968A.B.A. Sec. Ins. Negl. & Comp. L. Proc. 409 (1968); Lord Mustill, Ships are Different – or are they?,
easier availability of insurance or through an outright subsidisation (backed
by national judicial enforcement) of the maritime industry at the expense of
other interests. By definition, limitation of liability is intended to provide
partial immunity from civil action to a shipowner, and the practical answer
to any disquiet about the regime results either in an occasional amendment
to increase such limits or, in the aftermath of the Erika spill,86 the creation
of a new top-up regime, namely the Supplementary Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund through the coming into force of the 2003
Supplementary Fund Protocol.87 It is very significant that the latter instru-
ment went through in the wake of a European Union initiative to create a
regional oil pollution compensation fund.88
In effect therefore, the edifice of limitation of liability is regulatory in
nature and would therefore fall within the ambit of control of Article 1 of
protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.89 It is quite rea-
sonable to argue that a regulatory system which flouts the basic delict/tort
principle of restitutio in integrum by partially divesting the maritime party
from responsibility, extinguishes an otherwise existing right of action and by
allocating responsibility to the victim without justification, which violates
both the public interest and the proportionality principles central to the
application of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The argument is stronger where the claim against the shipowner is
based on fault or negligence rather than one based on strict liability; howev-
er, it cannot be excluded in the latter cases where the shipowner’s role
includes liability on the basis of the perceived need of society to encourage
and facilitate international trade. Businesses of all types already are the ben-
eficiaries of the capping of exposure to liability via the corporate structure
sanctioned by company law. Further enhancement of this benefit via mar-
itime limitation of liability undoubtedly lacks justification.
The first general part of the above mentioned Article 1 of Protocol 1
would appear to be violated with the application of maritime limitation of
liability. One may at this stage refer to the celebrated case of Bramelid and
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1993, LMCLQ 490; D. Steel, Q.C., Ships are Different: the Case for Limitation of Liability, 1995
LMCLQ 77; Gauci, G., Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law: an Anachronism?, Marine Policy, Vol.
19, No. 1 (1995), pp. 65-74; Little, G., The Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention: a New
Horizon in the Regulation of Marine Pollution, LMCLQ 1998, 4 (Nov.), 554-567.
86December 1999.
87The 2003 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992.
88See Blackburn Elizabeth QC, Civil Liability for Marine Pollution, Damage by Hazardous/Noxious
Substances, Nuclear Incidents and Compensation, Chapter 19 at p. 971-972 in Mandaraka-Sheppard, A.,
Modern Maritime Law, 2d edition, Routledge Cavendish, 2007.
89See Gladysheva v. Russia – ECHR 7097/10 Judgment 6.12.2011.
Malmstrom v. Sweden,90 where, in the context of the first part of article 1 of
protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European
Commission on Human Rights stated in its decision that “the Commission
must nevertheless satisfy itself that, when making rules as to the effects on
property of legal relations between individuals, the legislature does not cre-
ate an imbalance between them which would result in one person arbitrari-
ly and unjustly being deprived of his goods for the benefit of another.”
Furthermore, in the case of Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine,91 even
though “there was no direct deprivation by the domestic authorities of the
applicant company’s possessions and no interference comparable to such a
deprivation,” the European Court of Human Rights found that there was a
violation of Article 1 of protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. This author is of the opinion that it is only a matter of time before
limitation of liability is consigned to maritime history. In this respect, it is
notable that developments in state, as distinct from federal United States
law, have made inroads into the eventual abolition of limitation of liability
in the field of compensation for ship source oil pollution damage.92 In addi-
tion, at the federal level, an attempt was made in the so-called Oberstar Bill93
drafted in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to remove the $75
million limitation of liability cap under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in
respect of offshore facilities. The shipping industry was however given a
reprieve94 and the bill unfortunately was not enacted.95
VII
CONCLUSION
Compulsory insurance per se is unlikely to provide a complete solution
such as to constitute restitutio in integrum, although, to some extent, it may
well reduce the immediate costs consequent to an accident which are borne
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90(1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 249, 12 October 1982.
91(Application no. 48553/99) Judgment, Strasbourg, 25 July 2002 06/11/2002.
92See, generally, Gauci, G., Oil Pollution from Ships – Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage,
John Wiley and & Sons, Chichester 1997, at. 173.
93Oil Spill Accountability and Environmental Protection draft bill (H.R. 5629 (111th); the preamble
to this bill (sponsored by Rep. James Oberstar) describes the aim of the bill as being: “To ensure full
recovery from responsible parties of damages for physical and economic injuries, adverse effects on the
environment, and clean-up of oil spill pollution, to improve the safety of vessels and pipelines support-
ing offshore oil drilling, to ensure that there are adequate response plans to prevent environmental dam-
age from oil spills, and for other purposes.”
94See: Joshi, R., Shipping Sidesteps Unlimited Liability, but for How Long? Lloyd’s List 12 July 2010;
.Joshi, R., Shipping awaits vote on US Oil Spill Bill, Lloyd’s List, 28 July 2010.
95http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr5629, (accessed on 8th October 2013).
by society. Indeed, this point is tacitly accepted in the existing Conventions
providing for compensation for pollution damage. The creation of an inter-
national fund, which in the ship-source oil pollution sphere can exist over
and above, or as a supplement to, the protection of a claim through com-
pulsory insurance, has been well utilised. This is the case in terms of the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds of 1971 and 1992, the
IOPC Supplementary Fund of 200396 and the still to be created HNS Fund.
However, all these funds are protected by a limitation or capping of liabili-
ty.
There are various reasons to justify the necessity of an international mar-
itime fund as an insurer of last resort for claims subject to limitation of lia-
bility. The first reason would be that, however effective the enforcement of
a compulsory insurance regime, there is always the possibility that an unin-
sured or an inadequately insured vessel will slip through the net. Second, as
the liability of the insured is almost always going to be limited, a victim may
well fail to achieve full compensation. Third, in the unlikely eventuality that
an insured loses the right to limit liability, the insurer will in all probability,
at least in English law, enforce a contractual or statutory capping on his lia-
bility. In the latter eventuality, even though a theoretical right of action to
pursue restitutio in integrum against the insured shipowner exists, this
avenue may not be worth pursuing in practice. Fourth, in the English system,
there are the difficulties associated with the uneasy relationship between the
right of direct action and the “pay first” rule.
It is suggested that, de lege ferenda, it may well be worthwhile pursuing
at the international level, possibly under the auspices of the IMO, the setting
up of a similar scheme to help victims of shipping incidents in their quest
for full compensation. There are various options for the financing of such
fund, including contributions from the major shipping liability insurers.
However, the ultimate solution will involve the abolition of limitation of
liability, an imposition of compulsory insurance well beyond the ambit of
application of the European Directive on the same matter, and by the impo-
sition, where possible, of a regime of strict, rather than negligence/fault-
based, liability. A Fund administered by the International Maritime
Organisation should not be designated simply as a top-up system, but also
as an insurance of very last resort. The question, however, remains as to
whether this can be achieved at an international level in the foreseeable
future.
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96See: www.iopcfunds.org.
